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課程名稱 |
道爾的第二人稱倫理學
Darwall's Second-personal Ethics |
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開課學期 |
105-2 |
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授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
彭文本 |
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課號 |
Phl7785 |
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課程識別碼 |
124 M7730 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
3.0 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期四3,4,5(10:20~13:10) |
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上課地點 |
哲研討室三 |
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備註 |
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。D斷代。D領域。
總人數上限：15人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1052Phl7785_ |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
關於第一人稱或是第二人稱觀點的爭論無疑是當代倫理學最重要的問題之一。柯絲卡在其《規範性的來源》(1996a)一書中首先發展她的第一人稱觀點的理論。與柯絲卡對照下，道爾也在他的《第二人稱觀點，德性，尊敬以及可歸責性》(2006)發展其第二人稱觀點的立場。爾後道爾繼續擴張這個新視野在之後出版的兩本書: 《道德性、權威以及法律: 第二人稱倫理學I》(2013a)和《榮譽、歷史和人際關係: 第二人稱倫理學II》(2013b)。本課程將討論道爾這個第二人稱觀點理論的發展，在前半學期集中討論他2006出版的書重要的章節，後半學期選擇2013兩本書比較代表性的議題文章。除此之外，也會加入評論這個議題的學術論文。 |
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課程目標 |
本課程的目標是要掌握當代英語世界倫理學的最新研究。
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課程要求 |
(1)上課前事先閱讀指定文獻；(2)課程間積極參與討論；(3)口頭報告ㄧ次；(4)期末繳交一份書面報告 |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
主要閱讀文獻:
Darwall, Stephen 2006: The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, andAccountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
— 2013a: Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2013b: Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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參考書目 |
次要參考文獻:
Darwall, Stephen 2001: :Because I want it”. Social Philosophy and Policy 18(2): 129-153
— 2007: “Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson”. Ethics 118, 52–69.
— 2009: “Why Kant needs the Second-Person Standpoint”. Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, ed. By Thomas E. Hill, 138-158.
— 2010a: “Reply to Schapiro, Smith/Strabbing, and Yaffe”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXI, 253–264.
— 2010b: “Moral Obligation: Form and Substance”. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society CX, 31–46.
— 2011: “Being With”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, 4–24.
— 2013a: Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2013b: Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2014: “Why Fichte’s Second-Personal Foundations Can Provide a More Adequate. Account of the Relation of Right Than Kant’s”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 5-20.
Enoch, David 2006: “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come fromWhat Is Constitutive of Action”. Philosophical Review 115, 169–198.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 2000: Foundations of Natural Right. Translation by Michael Bauer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hanisch, Christoph 2013: Why the Law Matters to You. Boston, MA: De Gruyter.
— 2014: “Self-Constitution and Other-Constitution: The Non-Optionality of the Second-Person Standpoint” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 105-129.
Kant, Immanuel. 1996a: Critique of Practical Reason. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
─ 1996b: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996a: The Sources of Normativity. Edited by Onora O’Neill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— 1996b: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— 2007: “Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint.” Ethics 118, 8–23.
— 2008: The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2009: Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2011: “Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan”. Metaphilosophy 42, 381–394.
Pauer-Studer, Herlinde 2010: “The Moral Standpoint: First or Second Personal?”. European Journal of Philosophy 18, 296–310.
— 2014a: “Contractualism and The Second-Person Moral Standpoint” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 149-168.
— 2014b: “A Constitutive Account of Group Agency” Erkennen 79, 1623-1639.
Rawls, John 1980: Kantian constructivism in moral theory. The Journal of Philosophy 77, 515-572.
Ridge, Michael 2015: “Naive Practical Reasoning and the Second-Person Standpoint: Simple Reasons for Simple People?” Value Inquiry 49, 17-30.
Scanlon, T.M. 1998: What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schapiro, Tamar 2010: “Desires as Demands: How the Second-Person Standpoint Might Be Internal to Reflective Agency”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXI, 229–236.
Wood, Allen 2008: Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— 2016: Fichte’s Ethical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
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1. |
課堂參與 |
30% |
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2. |
口頭報告 |
30% |
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3. |
書面報告 |
40% |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
2/23 |
課程介紹，分配報告主題 |
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第2週 |
3/02 |
Darwall 2006, chap.1 The Main Ideas I |
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第3週 |
3/09 |
Darwall 2006, chap.2 The Main Ideas II |
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第4週 |
3/16 |
Darwall 2006, chap.3 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasons |
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第5週 |
3/23 |
Darwall 2006, chap.4 Accountability and the Second Person |
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第6週 |
3/30 |
Darwall 2006, chap.5 Moral Obligation and Accountability |
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第7週 |
4/06 |
Darwall 2006, chap.6 Respect and the Second Person |
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第8週 |
4/13 |
Darwall 2006, chap.9 Morality and Autonomy in Kant |
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第9週 |
4/20 |
Darwall 2006, chap.10 Dignity and the Second Person: Variations on Fichtean Themes |
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第10週 |
4/27 |
Darwall 2013a, chap. 5 Morality and Principle |
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第11週 |
5/04 |
Darwall 2013a, chap. 6 “Because I want it” |
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第12週 |
5/11 |
Darwall 2013a, chap 7. The Value of Autonomy of the Will |
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第13週 |
5/18 |
Darwall 2013a, chap. 8 Authority and Second-Personal Reasons for Acting |
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第14週 |
5/25 |
Darwall 2013b chap. 5 Ressentiment and Second-Personal Resentment (Nietzsche) |
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第15週 |
6/01 |
Darwall 2013b chap. 7 Being with (Heidegger) |
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第16週 |
6/08 |
Darwall 2013b chap. 11 Fichte and the Second-Person Standpoint
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第17週 |
6/15 |
Darwall 2013b chap 12 Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect
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第18週 |
6/22 |
Darwall 2014: “Why Fichte’s Second-Personal Foundations Can Provide a More Adequate. Account of the Relation of Right Than Kant’s |
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